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Abstract
This paper deals with modeling the effects of introducing a market-based tool
for improving end-users’ efficiency in an energy market which is already regulated
through a cap-and-trade system for green house gas emissions and a quota system
meant to improve competitiveness of energy produced using renewable resources. In
this model, distributors of energy are perceived as regional monopolists which are
able to set the price of energy paid by consumers in their respective region. Once
a White Certificate Trading Scheme (WCTS) is implemented, distributors are held
responsible for achieving consumers’ energy savings and energy efficiency targets set
by regulation authorities. Results show that this way of regulating energy demand
achieves its underlying objects of energy savings and energy efficiency solely at the
expense of other goals such as the environmental efficiency of energy production,
an effect described as pincers policy (Meran, Wittmann [8]). Moreover, in case of
assuming a regular, i.e. falling, demand curve for energy, a price-induced reduction
of demand in energy, if necessary, combined with buying white certificates will al-
ways be preferred by distributors over implementing incentive mechanisms to enforce
consumers’ investment in energy efficiency. Only if the properties of the model are
varied, distributors will set an incentive greater than zero. However, in any case,
without a reduction of the cap on emissions and an increase of the minimum quota
of renewable energy, the introduction of WCTS will result in negative side effects
on the environmental goals set on energy production and the amount of renewable
energy produced. Therefore, implementing WCTS into a market which is already
highly regulated cannot exactly be considered the icing on the cake of environmental
policy. On the contrary, the amount and intensity of interdependencies and, hence,
the countervailing effects of the various policy measures are intensified. Rather than
proposing the introduction of yet another policy instrument, this paper opts for
postulating the use of existing policy measures in a more effective way, in order to
achieve all goals of environmental policy simultaneously.
Keywords:Energy Markets, Monopoly, Certificate Trading Scheme, White Cer-
tificates, Efficiency, Regulation, Market-based tool, pincers policy
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1. Introduction
As has already been shown by Montgomery, establishing markets for certificates can
result in achieving a certain level of environmental quality efficiently, since social
costs of pollution, assuming that they are feasibly calculable, have been accounted
for, and hence, internalized (Montgomery, [9]). In trying to comply with the en-
vironmental demands postulated by the Kyoto-protocol, participating nations have
established markets for permits (Sorrell, S., Sijm, J. [15]) controlling the emissions of
various greenhouse gases (GHG), so called Brown Certificates. Moreover, means of
improving the competitiveness of energy produced from renewable resources (Green
Energy) have been undertaken in various counties, e.g. through the implementa-
tion of a Green Certificate Trading Scheme (Amundsen, E.S., Mortensen, J.B. [1]).
However, as environmental goals have become increasingly ambitious, due to the
fact that decision-makers are worried about the negative effects of a possible emis-
sion induced climate change on mankind, measures to reduce energy consumption
of households have become the latest focus of attention (OECD, [11]). Hence, many
people propose the establishment of a market for tradable permits gained by con-
sumers of energy through investing in measures that will increase their respective
energy efficiency (RWI (2006) [14]) and thereby reduce their demand for energy. In
a few European Countries, like Great Britain, France, and Italy such a market-based
tool has already been implemented (OECD, [11]), known as White Certificate Trad-
ing Scheme (WCTS). Due to reasons of practicability, distributors are to take part
in WCTS, whereas households are only indirectly affected. Hence, if a distributors’
consumers fail to fulfill a minimum requirement of energy efficiency measures which
reduces their aggregate demand of energy to a certain target level set by authori-
ties, the respective distributor needs to compensate for this gap by buying White
Certificates. If a distributors’ consumers surpass their requirements they thereby
generate White Certificates which can be sold by their distributor (Bürger, [3]).
This describes, in short, the workings of WCTS .
Despite all of the arguments in favor of WCTS stated in the present literature,
the effects of introducing WCTS into a market system, which is already regulated
through a cap-and-trade system for green house gas emissions and a quota system
meant to improve competitiveness of energy produced using renewable resources,
are less favorable than it might appear at first glance. Results show that this way
of regulating energy demand achieves its underlying objects of energy savings and
energy efficiency solely at the expense of other goals such as the environmental effi-
ciency of energy production, an effect described as pincers policy (Meran, Wittmann
[8]). Moreover, in case of assuming a regular, i.e. falling, demand curve for energy,
a price-induced reduction of demand in energy, if necessary, combined with buy-
ing white certificates will always be preferred by distributors over implementing
incentive mechanisms to enforce consumers’ investment in energy efficiency. Only
if the properties of the model are varied, distributors will set an incentive greater
than zero. However, in any case, without a reduction of the cap on emissions and
an increase of the minimum quota of renewable energy, the introduction of WCTS
will result in negative side effects on the environmental goals set on energy produc-
tion and the amount of renewable energy produced.Therefore, implementing WCTS
into a market which is already highly regulated cannot be considered the icing on
the cake of environmental policy. On the contrary, the amount and intensity of
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interdependencies and, hence, the countervailing effects of the various policy mea-
sures are intensified. Rather than proposing the introduction of yet another policy
instrument, this paper opts for postulating the use of existing policy measures in
a more effective way, in order to achieve the ambitious goals of environmental policy.
The paper is structured as follows: Before dealing with the implementation of WCTS
the outline of the model is presented in section two. In section three, a total in-
tegration of end-users into WCTS is modeled. Section four deals with a possible
incentive mechanism implemented by distributors to foster energy efficiency mea-
sures and, hence, increase energy savings of their consumers. The issue of possible
measures of cost recovery by distributors is dealt with in section six. Section seven
deals with the issue of setting a price cap on the price of energy and the effects of
WCTS if implemented under these conditions. Section seven deals with relaxing
the assumption that all distributors need to take part in WCTS. This constitutes a
model of partial integration of distributors into WCTS. Section eight deals with the
effects of policy measures which can be used instead of WCTS, such as the reduction
of the cap on emissions and the increase in the quota of renewable energy. Section
nine is comprised of some concluding remarks.
2. Basics of the Modela
First of all, in many countries, the energy market is characterized by imperfect
competition, as it has already been stated in other papers (Fadeeva, [4]). However,
In order to isolate the effects of WCTS, imperfect competition is assumed only on
behalf of distributors of energy, which are perceived as regional monopolists, able to
set the price of energy sold to their consumers. Producers of energy are supposed
to operate under perfect competition. Hence, the setting can be described as fol-
lows: There are four groups that are involved in the market for energy: producers
of energy produced using non-renewable resources (Brown Energy), producers of
energy produced using renewable resources (Green Energy), distributors and end-
users of energy. In the absence of WCTS markets for Green and Brown Certificates
are already in place and assumed to be working properly. Sanctions for noncom-
pliance with regulations, quotas or standards are assumed to be effective as well,
so that there is no incentive to defect. Whereas the market for Brown Certificates
is designed as a cap-and-trade market with maximum emissions set at level e¯, the
market for Green Certificates is based on a minimum quota system α[0, 1] of green
energy in relation to total energy consumed and produced as seen in the paper of
Amundsen and Mortensen (Amundsen, E.S., Mortensen, J.B. [1]). Now, properties
and equations for each set of actors need to be defined.
The Supply Sideb
This side of the market consists of producers of energy produced using non-renewable
resources (Brown Energy)and producers of energy produced using renewable re-
sources (Green Energy). The market is assumed to be perfectly competitive. Hence,
all of them are assumed to be price-takers without market power.
aFor details on calculations of the results presented in all following sections please refer to the denoted
sections of the appendix.
bModeling the supply side is based on Meran, Wittmann [8].
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Green Energy:
The producers of Green Energy receive wholesale price q for each unit of Green
Energy y produced as well as the price s of Green Certificates, which can be perceived
as a market based subsidy paid by distributors. The costs of production K(y),
Ky > 0,Kyy > 0, are assumed to be relatively high. Hence, without subsidies
and quota α Green Energy would not be able to compete successfully with Brown
Energy. Profits are maximized according to
maxy [(q + s)y −K(y)]
which results in the following first order condition (FOC):
Ky(y) = (q + s) (1)
As a result, the amount of Green Energy produced can be expressedc by the following
supply function:
yˆ = yˆ(q + s), yˆq > 0 (2)
Brown Energy:
The producers of Brown Energy face production costs C(x), Cx > 0,Cxx > 0 as
a function of units of energy produced x, which are assumed to be relatively low,
compared to the costs of producing Green Energy. However, the production of en-
ergy using non-renewable resources is assumed to result in emissions of Greenhouse
Gases, such as CO2. Therefore, producers of Brown Energy incur additional costs
as they need to comply with emission cap e¯ set by regulation authorities and need
to buy a certificate at price z for each unit (e) of CO2 emitted. Additionally, they
could also invest in abatement technologies I at priceD which reduces the amount of
emission per unit of energy produced (Montgomery [9]). Emission can, thereby, be
expressed as a function of amount of energy produced and investment in abatement:
e = e(x, I), ex > 0 and eI < 0 (3)
It is assumed that emissions rise as x rises and fall as I rises. In both cases, di-
minishing marginal effects exist, i.e. ex > 0, exx > 0, eI < 0, eII > 0. Moreover,
it is assumed that the marginal impact on emissions through an increase in output
diminishes as I rises, i.e. exI = eIx < 0. Finally, e(x, I) is convex and, hence,
producers’ resulting profit function is concave. Profits are maximized according to
maxx,I [qx− C(x)− ze(x, I)− ID]
which results in the following FOCs:
q = Cx(x) + zex(x, I) (4)
D = −zeI(x, I) (5)
cappendix I.1, equation (51)
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As a result, the amount of Brown Energy produced and the amount of investment
made can be expressed as a function of prices q, z, i.e.
xˆ = xˆ(q, z) and Iˆ = Iˆ(q, z) (6)
since D = D¯ is held constant. In order to analyze the effects on xˆ and Iˆ with respect
to changes in prices q and z, equations (4) and (5) are used. Changes in q render
the following results: As it is shown in in the appendix d, both xˆ and Iˆ rise in q,
i.e. xˆq > 0 and Iˆq > 0. Changes in z result in the subsequent effects: As it is shown
in in the appendix e, while xˆ is negatively correlated to z, Iˆ increases if z rises, i.e.
xˆz < 0 and Iˆz > 0. To summarize
xˆq > 0, Iˆq > 0, xˆz < 0, Iˆz > 0 (7)
Subsequently, we need to determine the reaction of the emission function, i.e.
eˆ(q, z) = e(xˆ, Iˆ), to possible changes in q and z:
eˆ(q, z) = e(xˆ(q, z), Iˆ(q, z)) (8)
From equations (3) and (7) it follows that
eˆz = exxˆz + eI Iˆz < 0 (9)
The reaction of eˆ to an increase in q is ambiguous. This follows from
eˆq = exxˆq + eI Iˆq (10)
and equation (7) to (8). In the following, it is assumed that eˆq > 0, since, as en-
ergy wholesale price increases, production rises and, therefore, emissions increase,
as well. The countervailing effect of an increase in abatement investment (I) does
not compensate for an increase in emissions due to an increase in the production of
Brown Energy x.
The Demand Side
This side of the market consists of distributors and end-users of energy.
End-users:f
We assume a strictly concave utility function U , which depends on the amount of
energy consumed v at price p and the amount of investment i in energy efficiency at
price d. The utility function U can be perceived as a reduced form of a traditional
utility function and a household production function (Wirl [17]). In the absence of
White Certificates, the utility of a representative household of region j is maximized
according to
maxvj ,ij [U(vj, ij)− pjvj − ijd]
dappendix I.1, equation (52)
eappendix I.1, equation (55)
fModeling End-users is based on Meran, Wittmann [8].
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which results in the following FOCs:
pj = Uvj(vj, ij) and d = Uij(vj, ij) (11)
The equilibrium amount of energy demanded vˆj and the amount of investment
chosen iˆj can be expressed as a function of market price pj
vˆj = vˆj(pj) iˆj = iˆ(pj)
as we assume d = d¯ to be constant.
Results regarding changes in pj are as follows: While vˆj is always negatively cor-
related regarding changes in pj, iˆj is positively (negatively) related to pj, if iˆj and
vˆj are substitutes (complements). Considering changes in d we obtain the follow-
ing results as shown in the appendix g: While iˆj is always negatively correlated
regarding changes in d, vˆj is positively (negatively) related to d, if iˆj and vˆj are
substitutes (complements). In the following it is assumed that energy consumption
and investment in energy efficiency are substitutes.
Distributors:
The distributors buy energy from producers at wholesale price q and sell it at market
price p, i.e. p > q. They are not able to influence wholesale prices, as they are seen as
relatively small regional monopolists. Nonetheless, distributor j, ∀j = 1, ..., n, is able
to set the market price pj of its region j and to maximize its profits accordingly.
Distributors need to ensure that the amount of Green Energy satisfies quota α
and, hence, are forced to buy the respective amount of Green Certificates at price
s. As Brown Energy is assumed to be relatively cheaper, distributors demand the
minimum amount of Green Energy, y = α(x+y) (minimum quota system), to satisfy
the demand in their respective region j. The total amount of energy demanded is
denoted by vˆ = xˆ+ yˆ (market equilibrium), whereas vˆ = Σni=1vˆj. Also, distributors
incur network costs cn(v), with cnv (v) > 0, cnvv(v) > 0, which depend on the amount
of energy distributed. Hence, each distributor j maximizes its profits according to
max
pj
(pj − q − αs)vˆj(pj)− cn(vˆj) (12)
Utilizing the market equilibrium condition vˆj = xˆj + yˆj we arrive at
vˆj + (pj − q − αs− cnvj)
∂vˆj
∂pj
= 0 (13)
which yields
pj +
vˆj(pj)
∂vˆj(pj)
∂pj
= q + αs+ cnvj , ∀j = 1, .., n. (14)
Distributors will set marginal revenue equal to marginal cost and choose prices pj
such that they are facing the profit maximizing, unitary elastic, section of the de-
mand curve, i.e. |(pj)| = 1, i.e. |(pj)| = pjvˆj
∂vˆj
∂pj
, and vˆj(1 + |(pj)|) = q + αs + cnvj .
Now, we are able to move on to the core of our model.
gUsing equation (11), and appendix I.2 equation (62)
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3. Total Integration of End-users into WCTS
Taking all assumptions and previously stated settings into account, we can deter-
mine the equilibrium conditions for the energy markets and the market for Brown
Certificates through equations(15) to (17):
(1− α) Σnj=1vˆj(pj)− xˆ(q, z) = 0 (15)
α Σnj=1vˆj(pj)− yˆ(q + s) = 0 (16)
e¯ − eˆ(q, z) = 0 (17)
and equations (14) determining equilibrium prices pj for every region j.
Solving these equations, results in a set of equilibrium prices in the absence of
WCTS, i.e. qo, zo, so > 0, and poj > 0.
The introduction of an effective WCTS into the market system by establishing a
maximum quantity of energy demanded v¯j for every region j, results in the following
equations, taking into account that v¯j < vˆj(poj):
(1− α) Σnj=1vˆj(pj)− xˆ(q, z) = 0 (18)
α Σnj=1vˆj(pj)− yˆ(q + s) = 0 (19)
e¯ − eˆ(q, z) = 0 (20)
Σnj=1v¯j − Σnj=1vˆj(pj) = 0 (21)
Equilibrium market prices pj is now determined through a slight modification of
equation (12) taking into account that for every unit of energy consumed more
(less) than v¯j a White Certificate w has to be bought (is generated)
max
pj
(pj − q − αs)vˆj(pj)− cn(vˆj) + w(v¯j − vˆj(pj)) (22)
which results in the following equilibrium condition for market prices pj
pj +
vˆj(pj)
∂vˆj(pj)
∂pj
= q + αs+ cnvj + w. (23)
Price w of white certificates is thereby perceived as an additional marginal cost of
energy production. Through the introduction of WCTS energy producers are forced
to adapt the goal of forcing demand to become equal to or less than v¯j. Naturally,
they do not have to buy w for every unit of energy distributed, however, every
unit of energy distributed less (more) than v¯j would generate (cost) w but they
would also forgo (gain) pj. Hence, w can be seen as a real cost for every unit of
energy distributed, where vˆj > v¯j, and as a opportunity cost for every unit of energy
distributed, where vˆj < v¯j.
The solution obtained by these equations leads to equilibrium prices defined as
pwj , q
w, sw, zw > 0, and w > 0.
Proposition 1 The introduction of a WCTS leads to an increase of iˆj and a de-
crease of Iˆ and of the amount renewable energy supplied yˆ.
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Proof: Let us begin with the latter statement. Since, by equation (8), e¯ = eˆ(q, z) =
e((1− α)v¯, Iˆ(q, z)), where v¯ = Σnj=1v¯j , it follows that Iˆv¯ > 0:
Iˆv¯ =
−(1− α)ex
eI
> 0 (24)
The equilibrium amount of renewable energy supplied is characterized by equation (2), i.e.
yˆ(q+s). Therefore, yˆv¯ = y1( ∂qˆ∂v¯ +
∂sˆ
∂v¯ ) > 0
h. As the amount of energy consumed is reduced,
i.e. v¯ = Σnj=1v¯j = Σ
n
j=1vˆ(p
w
j ) < Σ
n
j=1vˆ(p
o
j), the amount of renewable energy supplied is
reduced as well.
In order to prove the former assertion, we differentiate equation (11) with respect to v¯
which yields
∂iˆ
∂v¯ = −UivUii < 0
Applying some comparative statics to equations (18) to (23) i we arrive at
pwv¯ < 0, qwv¯ > 0, swv¯ ≷ 0, (qwv¯ + αswv¯ ) > 0, zwv¯ > 0, and wv¯ < 0
Now, all of the effects of implementing WCTS can be inferred. In order to in-
crease end-users’ energy savings and energy efficiency regulation authorities set
v¯ = Σnj=1v¯j < Σ
n
j=1vˆ(p
o
j). As sanctions are supposed to be working properly, dis-
tributors will force end-users to comply with v¯ through a price-induced reduction of
demand in energy. Depending on region j’s households utility function, the reduc-
tion in demand will determine whether distributor j becomes a net seller or a net
buyer of White Certificates, or simply meets v¯j = vˆj(pwj ). Moreover, consumers will
substitute energy consumption with investment in energy efficiency as its price as
also become relatively cheaper compared to the price of energy, i.e. d¯
pwj
< d¯
poj
. But
that is not the end of the story. The production of renewable energy yˆ decreases. As
the production of Brown Energy xˆ and the price of Brown Certificates z decreases,
along with the amount of investment in abatement technology Iˆ. Hence, the re-
duced amount of Brown Energy xˆ is produced using less investment in abatement
Iˆ ↓ and at a lower price for Brown Certificates z ↓, which results in an increase in
emissions per unit of energy [ eˆ(q,z)↑
xˆ(q,z)↓ ] ⇑. As a result, the environmental efficiency in
energy production is reduced. From an environmental point of view, this is clearly
a negative effect.
4. Implementing an Incentive Mechanism to further stimulate Households’
investment in Energy Efficiency
It has also been suggested, that distributors design an incentive mechanism to fur-
ther stimulate households’ investment in energy efficiency, e.g. wall insulation or
improvement of heating control (Fadeeva, [4]). This incentive can be perceived as a
market-based subsidy of energy efficiency measures. Instead of having to pay d¯ for
every unit of ij, households of region j now only pay (1 − σj)d¯, where 0 ≤ σj ≤ 1,
while the respective distributor j provides σj d¯ for every unit of ij acquired. In this
case, distributors are assumed to have perfect information about households’ Util-
ity function and their utility maximizing first order conditions. Therefore, they are
hAppendix II.2
iappendix II.1 and II.2
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able to predict households’ reaction to energy prices pj and incentive σj. Like a
Stackelberg leader, distributor j now chooses the profit maximizing level of pj and
σj, given v¯j accordingly. End-users’ utility maximizing conditions, equations (11)
are therefore modified as follows.
maxvj ,ij [U(vj, ij)− pjvj − (1− σj)ij d¯]
which results in the following FOCs:
pj = Uvj(vj, ij) and (1− σj)d¯ = Uij(vj, ij) (25)
The equilibrium amount of energy demanded vˆj and the amount of investment
chosen iˆj can be expressed as a function of market prices pj and σj which results in
vˆj = vˆj(pj, σj) iˆj = iˆj(pj, σj)
While equations (18) to (21) remain unchanged, equations (22) are modified.
max
pj ,σj
(pj−q−αs)vˆj(pj, σj)−cn(vˆj(pj, σj))+w(v¯j− vˆj(pj, σj))−σj d¯ iˆ(pj, σj) (26)
Proposition 2 In equilibrium, distributor j will set the incentive σˆj = 0 according
to Kuhn-Tucker conditions.
Proof:j Regarding the FOCs’ with respect to σj lead to the follows effects: As (pj − q −
αs− cnvj − w)
∂vˆj
∂σj
− d¯ iˆ− d¯ σj ∂iˆ∂σj < 0 it becomes clear that
0 6= (pj − q − αs− cnvj − w)
∂vˆj
∂σj
− d¯ iˆ− d¯ σj ∂iˆ
∂σj
(27)
and hence the condition σj [(pj − q − αs− cnvj − w)
∂vˆj
∂σj
− d¯ iˆ− d¯ σj ∂iˆ∂σj ] = 0 can only hold
true if σj = 0.
To sum it up, in this setting a distributor will never implement an incentive mech-
anism as a market-based subsidy to increase households’ investment in energy effi-
ciency. After distributor j has set σˆj = 0, the remaining set of equations equals the
model depicted in the previous section, i.e. (18) to (21), including both positive and
negative effects resulting from the implementation of WCTS. However, these results
imply that, aside from the assumption of perfect information, energy demand corre-
lates negatively to energy prices and that there are no goals or regulations regarding
the level of energy prices. As will be seen in section seven of this paper, if the latter
condition is changed, results differ.
5. Cost Recovery
Another issue that needs to be looked at, is the question of cost recovery on behalf
of distributors. In reality, distributors are eligible to redeem costs of WCTS by
increasing the price of energy - with or without limits - or, as known from the
Italian WCTS, there exists a fund out of which distributors receive redemption
for costs incurred through their efforts in reducing households’ demand in energy
and increase in energy efficiency (Quirion [12]). Assuming that for every White
Certificate generated distributor j receives an amount b, i.e. b > 0 and b(v¯j− vˆj(pw))
if v¯j > vˆj(pw), and b = 0 if v¯j ≤ vˆj(pw) .
jFor details on calculations please refer to appendix IV.
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Corollary 1 Every increase in b will be offset by an equivalent decrease of the price
in White Certificates w, i.e. ∂w
∂b
= −1.
Proof: Both instruments, White Certificates through price w and the redemption fund
through payment b, target the same section of the market. Distributor j maximizes its
profit according to a modification of equations (22) resulting in equations (69) and FOCs
pj +
vˆj
∂vˆj
∂pj
= q + αs+ cnvj + (w + b). (28)
whereas the remaining equilibrium conditions, i.e. equations (18) to (21) are unchanged.
(1− α) Σnj=1vˆj(pj)− xˆ(q, z) = 0 (29)
α Σnj=1vˆj(pj)− yˆ(q + s) = 0 (30)
e¯ − eˆ(q, z) = 0 (31)
Σnj=1v¯j − Σnj=1vˆj(pj) = 0 (32)
Equilibrium conditions render prices pbj , s
b
j , q
b
j , z
b
j , and w > 0. As b > 0, changes in the
price of White Certificates are ∂w∂b = −1, whereas
∂pj
∂b ,
∂q
∂b ,
∂s
∂b ,
∂z
∂b = 0
k.
This kind of offsetting effect of two policy instruments, which simultaneously target
an identical section of the market, has already been referred to in Heilmann [5]. The
remaining results are therefore identical to those witnessed in section three.
6. Price Caps
So far, it has been the case, that there is no upper limit on the price set by distributor
j. If it were the case that after introducing WCST distributors were only allowed
increase price by a certain percentage µ, i.e. 0 ≤ µ < 1, such that pwj = (1 + µ) poj ,
the price-induced reduction of demand might not suffice to meet the requirement of
v¯j ≥ vˆj(pwj ). Market equilibrium is defined by the following equations
(1− α) Σnj=1vˆj(pj)− xˆ(q, z) = 0 (33)
α Σnj=1vˆj(pj)− yˆ(q + s) = 0 (34)
e¯ − eˆ(q, z) = 0 (35)
Σnj=1v¯j − Σnj=1vˆj(pj) = 0 (36)
and the profit maximizing condition regarding distributor j
max
pj ,σj
(pj−q−αs)vˆj(pj , σj)−cn(vˆj(pj , σj))+w (v¯j−vˆj(pj , σj))+t (v¯j−vˆj(pj , σj))−σj d¯ iˆ(pj , σj)
(37)
subject to pwj ≤ (1 + µ) poj .
Proposition 3 If the increase in price does not suffice to match v¯j ≥ vˆj(pwj ), the price of
White certificates will become extremely high, as no one, or only few distributors are able
to generate any. Assuming that per unit sanctions t for noncompliance with v¯j are working
properly and are set at a very high lever, distributors will set σˆj > 0.
kfor details on calculations please refer to appendix V.
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Proof: As the maximum possible price is pw¯j = (1 + µ) p
o
j which results in v¯j < vˆj(p
w
j ).
Therefore, the only way to reduce the amount of energy demanded is setting σj > 0 as the
amount of energy demanded correlates negatively to changes in σj , i.e.
∂vˆj
σj
< 0. As per
unit sanction t and the price of White Certificates w are supposed to be extremely high
and prices pw¯j are fixed, the FOCs of equations (37) with respect to σj are now able to
satisfy the equations
0 = (pj − q − αs− cnvj − w − t)
∂vˆj
∂σj
− d¯ iˆ− d¯ σj ∂iˆ
∂σj
(38)
Therefore, the condition σj [(pj − q − αs− cnvj −w− t)
∂vˆj
∂σj
− d¯ iˆ− d¯ σj ∂iˆ∂σj ] = 0 holds true,
even if σj > 0.
Through setting σj > 0, distributor j reduces its consumers demand for energy, i.e.
vˆj(pw¯j , σj) < vˆj(p
w¯
j ),∀ σj > 0. However, the question remains, how high the incentive
will be set.
Corollary 2 Distributors j will utilize an incentive mechanism to improve energy effi-
ciency, and thereby reduce the amount of energy demanded, as long as its costs are less or
equal to per unit sanctions of noncompliance with v¯j.
Proof:In equilibrium, distributor j will be indifferent between the per unit sanction t,
assuming that t < w, or the costs of the incentive mechanism
t (v¯j − vˆj(pj , σj)) = σj d¯ iˆ(pj , σj) (39)
which results in an equilibrium level of incentive mechanism σˆj
σˆj = −[t ∂vˆj
∂σˆj
+ (ˆij +
∂iˆj
∂σˆj
)d¯] > 0 (40)
In case of price caps, distributors will utilize the incentive mechanism to increase end-users
energy efficiency. As a result, end-users’ investment in energy efficiency rises, as iˆjσj > 0,
and the amount of energy demanded decreasesl, as vˆjσj < 0. However, the negative effects of
introducing WCTS into the market regarding investment in abatement (Iˆ) and the amount
of Green Energy produced (yˆ) are still present. Hence, even if the incentive mechanism
is implemented, without a increase in the minimum quota of Green Energy demanded, α,
and a decrease in the cap on emissions, e¯, WCTS has a negative impact on the goals of
environmental policy previously stated.
7. Partial integration of Distributors into WCTS
In reality, not all distributors of energy are forced to take part if WCTS is implemented.
Only distributors whose number of clients, i.e. number of households supplied, surpasses
a certain threshold set by regulation authorities have to comply (Oikonomou [12]). There-
fore, it is assumed that only a number of K distributors, i.e. K ⊂ n, with K 6= ∅, are large
enough to take part in WCTS while the remaining n − K distributors do not meet the
threshold requirement. Before introducing WCTS all distributors were faced with identical
profit maximizing conditions. Now, a representative distributer k of group K, i.e. k  K,
is setting its profit maximizing price pk according to equation (23) while a representative
lAppendix V.1, equations (73) and (74).
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distributor j of group (n-K), i.e. j  (n−K), utilizes equation (14) to set price pj . Hence,
market equilibrium is defined by modifying of equations (18) to (21)
(1− α) (ΣKk=1vˆk(pk) + Σ(n−K)j=1 vˆj(pj))− xˆ(q, z) = 0 (41)
α (ΣKk=1vˆk(pk) + Σ
(n−K)
j=1 vˆj(pj))− yˆ(q + s) = 0 (42)
e¯ − eˆ(q, z) = 0 (43)
ΣKj=1v¯k − ΣKj=1vˆk(pk) = 0 (44)
Proposition 4 In the absence of limits for energy prices, prices pk will always be higher
than pj m, as distributor k has to account for the opportunity cost w of every unit of energy
supplied, whereas distributor j does not have to.
Proof: Distributor k will set price pk according to
pk +
vˆj
∂vˆj
∂pj
= q + αs+ cnvj + w (45)
which results in the profit maximizing condition |(pk)| = pkvˆk
∂vˆk
∂pk
= 1, and vˆk(1+ |(pk)|) =
q + αs+ cnvk + w.
While distributor j will set price pj according to
pj +
vˆj
∂vˆj
∂pj
= q + αs+ cnvj (46)
which results in the profit maximizing condition |(pj)| = pjvˆj
∂vˆj
∂pj
= 1, and vˆj(1 + |(pj)|) =
q+αs+cnvˆj . Representative households j and k are characterized by equation (11). Applying
some comparative statics to equations (41) to (21) and equation (45) to (46) results in
pwk v¯ < 0, q
w
v¯ > 0, swv¯ ≷ 0, (qwv¯ + αswv¯ ) > 0, zwv¯ > 0, wv¯ < 0, and pwj v¯ > 0
As price pk set by the regulated distributor rises, demand of household k will decrease.
However, as wholesale prices decrease, the effect on the price set by distributor j is exactly
opposite to that. As pj decreases, demand of household j increases.
The question that remains is, how large the relative changes in demand are and whether
the two contrary effects offset each other or not.
Lemma 1 The increase in demand in vˆj(pwj ) does not completely offset the decrease in
demand caused by implementing v¯ = ΣKj=1v¯k, i.e.
∂vˆj(p
w
j )
∂v¯ < −1.
Proof: Please refer to appendix VI.3
The effects of implementing WCTS in case of partial integration are can certainly be con-
sidered ambiguous. Energy demand of households supplied by regulated distributors will
decrease, and cause investment in energy efficiency to increase, as its relative price is re-
duced. Energy demand of households supplied by unregulated distributors will increase,
and cause investment in energy efficiency to decrease, as its relative price is raised. The
mIt is assumed that households are bound to be supplied by their regional supplier.
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combined effect on wholesale prices and amount of energy produced depends on whether
∂vˆj(p
w
j )
∂v¯ ≶ −1. In case of this model, there is no completely offsetting effect, as
∂vˆj(p
w
j )
∂v¯ < −1,
however, implementing WCTS renders results which are far from what can be considered
a satisfying second-best solution from an environmental point of view.
8. Is less still more?
As the implementation of WCTS results in a negative impact on environmental policy
measures present in this model, an alternative is proposed. Instead of introducing yet
another policy measure, regulation authorities might achieve a better outcome by using
the policy instruments already prevalent in the market, such as the cap on emissions, e¯.
In equilibrium, equations (14), and (15) to (17) remain unchanged, i.e.
(1− α) Σnj=1vˆj(pj)− xˆ(q, z) = 0 (47)
α Σnj=1vˆj(pj)− yˆ(q + s) = 0 (48)
e¯ − eˆ(q, z) = 0 (49)
and
pj +
vˆj(pj)
∂vˆj(pj)
∂pj
= q + αs+ cnvj , ∀j = 1, .., n. (50)
Proposition 5 As e¯ is reduced, emissions become more costly due to an increase in
scarcity. Therefore, investment in abatement (I) will increase. Households’ investment
in energy efficiency (i) increases as well, as the wholesale price, and along with it the
market price, of energy increases.
Proof: Firstly, households’ reaction (i) to a reduction in the cap of emission needs to
defined, as well as the effect of the latter on investment in abatement (I). Comparative
statics n with respect to e¯ yields, that investment in energy efficiency increases, i.e. iˆj e¯ < 0.
Secondly, Brown Energy producers’ reaction to changes in e¯ is analyzed o. As shown in
the appendix, investment in abatement (I) increases as e¯ is reduced, Iˆe¯ < 0.
Results of an reduction in the cap of emissions are clearly favorable. The only negative
effect is the reduction in production of renewable energy, due to an overall decrease in
energy demanded, i.e. ∂vˆj∂e¯ > 0. There are two remedies to dispense with this problem.
First, regulation authorities could increase the minimum quota of renewable energy de-
manded, α. Second, the problem is solved by the market itself, if the cap on emissions
raises the price of Brown Energy to a such a level that the price of Green Energy is equal
or even less than that. In that case, distributors would be either indifferent between the
two types of energy or even prefer Green Energy over Brown Energy, as is has become
relatively cheaper. If there are no relevant restrictions on the capacity of production of
Green Energy, both alternatives present a possible and, which is even more important, a
environmentally favorable solution to the problem in question.
nappendix VIII.3, equation (82)
oappendix VIII.3, equation (81)
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9. Conclusions
In general, assuming distributors to be monopolists can be considered a relatively realistic
setting, looking at the history of various European Countries (Fadeeva, [4]). Other prob-
lems of environmental policy such as negative direct and indirect effects between policy
instruments (Heilmann, [5]) are displayed in this model, as well. Some experts assume
energy demand to be relatively inelastic to price changes (Bertoldi et. al. [2]) and propose
WCTS as a possible solution to successfully deal with this problem. However, in the set-
ting without price caps, WCTS is just another way to increase the relative price of energy.
As a result, the effect of a possible increase in energy prices due to the implementation of
WCTS will have no effect regarding end-users’ energy efficiency or energy consumption, if
the latter really reacted inelastic to price. If there are restrictions on energy prices, e.g.
price caps, an incentive mechanism created by distributors to increase energy efficiency
of end-users will pose an effective measure to reduce energy demand, as long as the per
unit sanctions of noncompliance on behalf of distributors are greater or equal to the cost
of the incentive mechanism. However, the negative effects of the introduction of WCTS,
regarding the amount of Green Energy produced and the level of investment in abatement
technology, remain prevalent and have to be dealt with. Therefore, even in this partic-
ular case the implementation of WCTS creates additional problems through its effect on
the environmental policy measures already in place. To sum it up, in this model, a very
sensible and effective way to achieve all of the environmental goals mentioned above is to
keep things simple. Instead of introducing another certificate system the policy measures
and the markets already in place need to be used to accomplish additional goals. Through
a reduction in the cap of emissions - and, if necessary, a raise in the quota for renewable
energy - all goals can successfully, efficiently, and effectively be achieved without having
to incur any negative side-effects or additional costs on behalf of regulation authorities.
Therefore, even in the case of trying to accomplish one more object through environmental
policy, regarding the given circumstances, implementing less measures really seems to be
the better deal.
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10. Appendix
I. Basics of the Model
I.1 The Supply Side
This side of the market consists of producers of energy produced using non-renewable resources
(Brown Energy)and producers of energy produced using renewable resources (Green Energy).
Green Energy:
Ky(y) = q + s, Kyyyˆq = 1, yˆq =
1
Kyy
> 0 (51)
Brown Energy:
Changes in q:
∆
(
xˆq
Iˆq
)
=
(−1
0
)
(52)
where ∆ =
(−(Cxx + zexx) −zexI
−zeIx −zeII
)
. Assuming concavity it follows that
|∆| = z(eII(zexx +Kxx)− ze2xI) > 0 (53)
From (52) it follows
xˆq =
zeII
|∆| > 0 Iˆq =
−zexI
|∆| > 0 (54)
Changes in z:
∆
(
xˆz
Iˆz
)
=
(
ex
eI
)
(55)
From (53) and (55) it follows
xˆz =
z(eIexI − exeII)
|∆| < 0 Iˆz =
z(exeIx − eI(Cxxz + exx))
|∆| > 0 (56)
I.2 The Demand Side
This side of the market consists of distributors and end-users of energy.
End-users:
Changes in p:
Ω
(
vˆp
iˆp
)
=
(
1
0
)
(57)
where Ω =
(
Uvv Uvi
Uiv Uii
)
.
By the assumption of concavity it follows that
|Ω| = UvvUii − U2vi > 0 (58)
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From (57) and (58) it follows that
vˆp =
Uii
|Ω| < 0 (59)
iˆp = −Uiv|Ω| > 0 , if i and v are substitutes and (60)
iˆp = −Uiv|Ω| < 0 , if i and v are complements (61)
Changes in d:
Ω
(
vˆd
iˆd
)
=
(
0
1
)
(62)
iˆd =
Uvv
|Ω| < 0 (63)
vˆd = −Uiv|Ω| < 0 (64)
, if i and v are complements
vˆd = −Uiv|Ω| > 0 (65)
, if i and v are substitutes.
In the following, it is assumed that investment in energy efficiency and energy consumption are
substitutes.
II. Total Integration of End-users into WCTS
II.1 Changes in prices pj with respect to v¯j are derived according to equation (21):
1 − Σnj=1vˆjpj
∂p
∂v¯j
= 0
which results in
Σnj=1
∂p
∂v¯j
= Σnj=1
1
vˆjpj
< 0 (66)
From (18) to (20) we can derive the effects of changes in v¯ on prices q, s and z:
Θ
qwv¯swv¯
zwv¯
 =
 αΣ
n
j=1vˆjpj
∂p
∂v¯j
(1− α)Σnj=1vˆjpj
∂p
∂v¯j
0
 (67)
where Θ =
yˆq yˆq 0xˆq 0 xˆz
eˆq 0 eˆz
.
Due to assumption of concavity and due to equations (3), (7), and (51), it can be inferred that
|Θ| = −yˆq(xˆq eˆz − xˆz eˆq) > 0 (68)
16
II.2 From (67) and (68) it follows that
qwv¯ =
−(1−α)Σnj=1vˆjpj
∂p
∂v¯j
xˆq eˆz
|Θ| > 0
swv¯ =
Σnj=1vˆjpj
∂p
∂v¯j
[eˆz((1−α)yˆq−αxˆq)−xˆz eˆq ]
|Θ| > 0
p
zwv¯ =
(1−α)Σnj=1vˆjpj
∂p
∂v¯j
yˆq eˆq
|Θ| > 0
and from equation (66) it follows that pwjv¯ > 0.
Changes in w are derived regarding equation (23):
∂w
∂v¯j
= ∂p∂v¯j − [
∂q
∂v¯j
+ α ∂s∂v¯j ]− cnvjvj vˆjpj
∂p
∂v¯j
+
vˆ2jpj
∂p
∂v¯j
−vˆj vˆjpjpj
∂p
∂v¯j
vˆ2jpj
∂w
∂v¯j
= ∂p∂v¯j β − [
∂q
∂v¯j
+ α ∂s∂v¯j ] < 0
Assuming that β = [1− cnvjvj vˆjpj +
vˆ2jpj
−vˆj vˆjpjpj
vˆ2jpj
] > 0.
III. Incentive Mechanism
Due to his Stackelberg leader position distributor j takes into account equations (25) and, hence,
maximizes equation (26) which results in
0 = vˆj(pj , σj) + (pj − q − αs− cnvj − w) ∂p∂v¯j − d¯σj
∂iˆj
∂pj
and 0 6= (pj − q − αs− cnvj − w)
∂vˆj
∂σj
− d¯ iˆ− d¯ σj ∂iˆ∂σj
IV. Cost Recovery
IV.1 Distributor j acts according to
max
pj
(pj − q − αs)vˆj(pj)− cn(vˆj) + w(v¯j − vˆj(pj)) + b(v¯j − vˆj(pj)) (69)
which results in pj +
vˆj
∂vˆj
∂pj
= q + αs+ cnvj + (w + b).
changes in prices p, q, s, and z with respect to b are defined through equations (29) to (32) and
changes in w are defined through equations (28) which leads to
Σnj=1
∂p
∂v¯j
= Σnj=1
0
vˆjpj
= 0 (70)
From (18) to (20) we can derive the effects of changes in v¯ on prices q, s and z:
Θ
qwbswb
zwb
 =
00
0
 (71)
where Θ =
yˆq yˆq 0xˆq 0 xˆz
eˆq 0 eˆz
 > 0 according to equation (68).
pDue to the assumption that (1− α)yˆq < αxˆq.
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IV.2 From (68) and (71) it follows that
qwv¯ =
0
|Θ| = 0
swv¯ =
0
|Θ| = 0
zwv¯ =
0
|Θ| = 0
and from equation (70) it follows that pwjb = 0.
Changes in w are derived regarding equation (28):
∂w
∂b = −1
V. Price Caps
V.1 Households act according to (25) which results in
End-users:
Changes in p:
Ω
(
vˆjσj
iˆjσj
)
=
(
0
−d¯
)
(72)
where Ω =
(
Uvv Uvi
Uiv Uii
)
.
According to equations (58) it follows that |Ω| > 0.
From (58) and (72) it follows that
vˆjσj =
d¯Uvi
|Ω| < 0 (73)
iˆjσj = −
d¯Uvv
|Ω| > 0 (74)
V.2 Maximizing equations (37) results in
0 = vˆj(pj , σj) + (pj − q − αs− cnvj − w − t) ∂p∂v¯j − d¯σj
∂iˆj
∂pj
and 0 = (pj − q − αs− cnvj − w − t)
∂vˆj
∂σj
− d¯ iˆ− d¯ σj ∂iˆ∂σj
assuming that t > pj − q − αs− cnvj − w.
VI. Partial integration of End-users into WCTS
VI.1 From equations (41) to (44) and equations (45) and (46) the effects on prices q, s, z, w, pk
and pj can be inferred.
With respect to changes in prices pk equations (44) render
ΣKk=1
∂pk
∂v¯k
= ΣKk=1
1
vˆkpk
< 0. (75)
With respect to changes in q, s, and z equations (41) to (43) render
Γ
qwv¯swv¯
zwv¯
 =
 αΣKk=1vˆkpk
∂pk
∂v¯k
(1− α)ΣKk=1vˆkpk ∂pk∂v¯k
0
 (76)
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where Γ =
 yˆq − αΣ
(n−K)
j=1 vˆjpj
1
$ yˆq − αΣ
(n−K)
j=1 vˆjpj
1
$ 0
xˆq − (1− α)Σ(n−K)j=1 vˆjpj 1$ −(1− α)Σ
(n−K)
j=1 vˆjpj
1
$ xˆz
eˆq 0 eˆz
,
due to the fact that equations (46) render, with respect to changes in pj
∂pj
∂v¯
=
∂q
∂v¯ + α
∂s
∂v¯
$
(77)
with $ = [1− cnvjvj vˆjpj +
vˆ2jpj
−vˆj vˆjpjpj
vˆ2jpj
] > 0.
Due to assumption of concavity and due to equations (3), (7), and (51), it can be inferred that
|Γ| = (αΣ(n−K)j=1 vˆjpj
1
$
− yˆq)(xˆq eˆz − xˆz eˆq) > 0 (78)
VI.2 From (76) and (78) it follows that
qwv¯ =
−α (1−α)Σ(n−K)j=1 vˆjpjΣ
K
k=1vˆkpk
∂pk
∂v¯k
eˆz−(1−α)(yˆq−αΣ(n−K)j=1 vˆjpj
1
$
)ΣKk=1vˆkpk
∂pk
∂v¯k
eˆz
|Γ| > 0
swv¯ =
Σ
(n−K)
j=1 vˆjpj
∂p
∂v¯j
1
$
[yˆq eˆz(1−α)−α(xˆq eˆz−eˆqxˆz)]
|Γ| ≷ 0
zwv¯ =
(1−α)Σ(n−K)j=1 vˆjpj
∂p
∂v¯j
1
$
yˆq eˆq
|Γ| > 0
and from equations (46) and (77) it follows that pwjv¯ > 0.
Changes in w are derived regarding equation (45):
∂w
∂v¯k
= ∂pk∂v¯k − [
∂q
∂v¯k
+ α ∂s∂v¯k ]− cnvkvk vˆkpk
∂pk
∂v¯k
+
vˆ2kpk
∂pk
∂v¯k
−vˆk vˆkpkpk
∂pk
∂v¯k
vˆ2kpk
∂w
∂v¯k
= ∂pk∂v¯k ζ − [
∂q
∂v¯k
+ α ∂s∂v¯k ] < 0
Assuming that ζ = [1− cnvkvk vˆkpk +
vˆ2kpk
−vˆk vˆkpkpk
vˆ2kpk
] > 0.
VI.3 Inserting pwjv¯ > 0 into
∂Σ
(n−K)
j=1 vˆj(p
w
j )
∂ΣKk=1v¯k
yields:
∂Σ
(n−K)
j=1 vˆj(p
w
j )
∂ΣKk=1v¯k
= Σ(n−K)j=1 vˆjpj
∂pj
∂ΣKk=1v¯k
≶ −1
regarding equations (77) this leads to
Σ(n−K)j=1 vˆjpj
∂q
∂v¯
+α ∂s
∂v¯
$ ≶ −1
Σ(n−K)j=1 vˆjpj
1
$ [
ΣKk=1vˆkpk
∂pk
∂v¯k
(α2(xˆz eˆq−xˆq eˆz)−(1−α)2yˆq eˆz)
Γ ] ≶ −1
which leads to
1
$ [−α2(xˆz eˆq − xˆq eˆz)− (1− α)2yˆq eˆz)] ≷
(αΣ
(n−K)
j=1 vˆjpj
−yˆq)(xˆz eˆq−xˆq eˆz)
Σ
(n−K)
j=1 vˆjpj
ΣKk=1vˆkpk
∂pk
∂v¯k
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and, since 1$ [−α2(xˆz eˆq− xˆq eˆz)− (1−α)2yˆq eˆz)] > 0 and
(αΣ
(n−K)
j=1 vˆjpj
−yˆq)(xˆz eˆq−xˆq eˆz)
Σ
(n−K)
j=1 vˆjpj
ΣKk=1vˆkpk
∂pk
∂v¯k
< 0 it is clear
that
∂Σ(n−K)j=1 vˆj(p
w
j )
∂ΣKk=1v¯k
< −1 (79)
VII. Is Less still more
VII.1 From (47) to (50) we can derive the effects of changes in e:
Γ
qle¯sle¯
zle¯
 =
00
1
 (80)
where |Γ| > 0 as shown in equation (78).
VII.2 From (47) to (50) and (80) it follows that
qle¯ =
(yˆq−α2Σnj=1vˆjpj )xˆz
|Γ| < 0
sle¯ =
xˆz(−(yˆq−αΣnj=1vˆjpj )xˆz
|Γ| > 0
zle¯ =
xˆq(α2Σnj=1vˆjpj
−yˆq)+(1−α)2yˆqΣnj=1vˆjpj
|Γ| < 0
and according to equations (50) it follows that
ple¯ < 0
VII.3 Regarding I: It follows from (6) and (7) that
Iˆe¯ = Iˆq
∂q
∂e¯
+ Iˆz
∂z
∂e¯
< 0 (81)
Regarding i:
Ω
(
vˆe¯
iˆe¯
)
=
(
pde¯
0
)
(82)
It follows from equations (58) and (82) that
ve¯ =
Uiip
l
e¯
|Ω| > 0
ie¯ = −Uivp
l
e¯
|Ω| < 0, as i and v are substitutes
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